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I. INTRODUCTION*
In early December 1968 the Town Council of Uitenhage began the first forced removals of
African people from the 124 year-old inner-city location of Kabah to the new township of Kwanobuhle
on the southern Municipal boundary. The removals were the beginning of a comprehensive plan to
make Uitentiage conform to apartheid urban policy principles by removing Africans from Kabah, where
they had historically lived side-by-side with coloureds, and reproclaiming the old location as part of the
growing coloured Group Area of the town. However, in the two decades that followed these removals,
Kabah was never fully conquered by the state. Both central and local governments perennially failed to
realise the goal of comprehensive social engineering due to shortages of funds, bureaucratic inefficiency,
continued migrations from Cape country districts, and the stubborn efforts of ordinary people to stake a
claim to urban space. By contrast, in 1968 Port Elizabeth was well along the path of near-total
segregation. A decade earlier Africans had been virtually entirely removed to proclaimed townships, and
in the late 1960s the Municipality was embarking on a program of removing coloureds from "white"
areas. The result of these programs was that Port Elizabeth soon became among the most segregated
cities in South Africa.
The Kabah removal was the culmination of more than twenty years of policy struggles within the
South African state, and explicit rejection by the Uitenhage Town Council of both the Urban Areas and
Group Areas Acts. It is quite remarkable that at the moment of greatest National Party power in the
1960s it proved quite unable to remake the world according to its will. Not only did it face profound
resource problems and resistance from below, rendering the "purist vision" of apartheid unattainable in
the short term, but the institutional means available to the central state to enforce its policies required it
to rely on relatively undependable local authorities as essential sites of delivery of services and exercise of
control. In July 1961, as the Uitenhage Town Council was about to conceded to central state pressure,
the local pro-Government newspaper Die Oosterlig reminded the Councillors, "'Render unto Caesar that
which is Caesar's' is a good idea for them to bear in mind."1
Local authorities were nominally responsible for maintaining immediate conditions of
accumulation for industry and commerce, and for the reproduction of the white as well as black working
classes. These tasks were conducted, if not more commonly avoided, under severe structural constraints
of fiscal dependence on white ratepayers. This dependence would lessen after 1973 when the central
state ultimately usurped authority over the townships, but until then the NP government ruled through
local institutions to which it could not simply dictate. Local constituencies heavily shaped Municipal
responses to central policies, and local officials varied widely in their ability or willingness to comply,
especially within UP strongholds. A politics of accommodation was necessary in which policy outcomes
were the result of a rough and tumble political process of coercion and concession, though increasingly
on terms defined by the central state. Nonetheless, it was a process of accommodation, which introduced
a considerable measure of variability in the application of central policies.
If the central state could, in the end, demand that local authorities "Render unto Caesar," this
seemingly confident assertion of power reveals in fact its opposite. In St. Matthew's account, Jesus' reply
to the Pharisees marks the difference between a merely earthly power with its essential limitations, and
that of a transcendent, omnipotent God. Similarly, once confronted with a challenge to its authority the
central state had little to fall back on other than a dictatorial exercise of power, even vis-a-vis its own
institutions, revealing the shallow and fragile nature of its own sovereignty. In this respect the invocation
of ultimate authority marks its very limitation, as ultimately the central state was forced to rely on these
very same institutions to exercise its power. This paper looks backward from the Kabah removals,
tracing the genesis of the segregation policies themselves to demonstrate the essentially contested nature
of state power in South Africa.
*A previous version of this paper was presented in 1988 at the seminars of the Southern Africa
Research Program at Yale University and at the Postgraduate Seminar of the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, University of London. The paper is drawn from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, "The
Factory Belongs to All Who Work in It': Race, Class, and Collective Action in the South African Motor
Industry, 1967-1986," (Columbia University, 1994).
As such, the research is influenced in important ways by Deborah Posel's insights into the nature
of the South African state, particularly in her assessment of the state as an actor in its own right
"engaged in ceaseless processes of struggle and accommodation, both internally and with subordinate as
well as dominant classes."2 It is curious that while her arguments about struggles over the meaning of
apartheid have gained wide currency, there has been far less recognition of her invitation to investigate
more thoroughly the coherence of the apartheid state itself.
This paper thus undertakes an institutional analysis of the development of policies of segregation
in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. In addition to giving a sustained account of the evolution of such
policies over the first decades of NP rule, it also self-consciously locates the discussion far away from the
mainstream of debate on apartheid. Though both cities experienced rapid population increases
throughout the period under review, the migrant itabour system played a negligible role in the regional
economy. In this respect, influx control and the contradictory relations between administrators,
employers, and migrant and "urbanised" workers iire relatively less important than in any other
metropolitan area in South Africa. Instead, territorial apartheid and residential segregation was a far
more central issue facing the central state and local authorities, as both attempted to deal with the racial
ordering of space. Though this is an important issue elsewhere, arguably it is of greater salience in the
Cape Province, given the enduring legacy of African, coloured, and Indian property (and franchise)
rights. An immediate problem confronting the NP government after 1948 was reversing and eliminating
patterns of residential integration, between whites and blacks and between those statutorily defined as
Africans, coloureds, and Indians.
In this respect, the paper makes a departure of sorts by examining the virtually simultaneous
enactment of the web of apartheid legislation in the two municipalities. Other analysts have tended to
focus exclusively on either the pass laws, or the Urban Areas Act, and few have linked their
implementation to the enforcement of the Group Areas Act. As a result scholars have missed the
combined impact of these policies on localities.
II. URBAN SEGREGATION BEFORE APARTHEID
A. SEGREGATION IN COLONIAL UITENHAGE AND PORT ELIZABETH
Segregation in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage dates from their founding. Cape colonial towns
were the realm of white settlers, but many different groups were present at their start.3 The black
population included many Malay artisans and traders, as well as Khoi labourers, and initial residential
divisions did not exclusively follow colour lines.4 AJ . Christopher argues rather that informal patterns of
class and social differentiation characterized residential growth in Port Elizabeth: mixed-race people were
free to own land and some people of colour clustered in new industrial areas where many white workers
also lived.5
However, white colonists did not consider the majority of indigenous people - "Africans" - to be
citizens of the colony capable of owning property, and more importantly, viewed them as foreigners,
temporary residents present only to labour. Africans were relegated to segregated, physically isolated
"locations" on land deemed unsuitable for white occupation. In both Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage the
first separate residential areas - initially for Khoi and later for Mfengu - were established on London
Missionary Society ground close to the town centres.6 After being created as Municipalities in the 1840s
both towns established formal locations close to these original LMS locations.7 Over time, these
locations expanded and many entrepreneurs opened private locations to accommodate the increased
African population.
By the time of Union in 1910 the pattern of segregation in Port Elizabeth diverged from that of
its neighbour. The inner-city locations were the target of a sustained removal effort, perpetually delayed
by the absence of funds to compensate site holders or to provide alternative accommodation in new
areas. The removals finally occurred under the pretext of plague clearance, and most Africans in Port
Elizabeth were moved to New Brighton, 8 kilometres from the centre of town.8 But a loophole in the
new law - Africans could be compelled to leave town but not to enter the location - enabled many to
avoid the heavily controlled and expensive barracks housing at New Brighton and to move instead to
Korsten, a land development beyond the Municipal boundaries.9
Despite population increases, Uitenhage's original locations - including the oldest, Kabah - were
never forcibly removed.10 These were built on the periphery of the town, and did not impede the
further expansion of either commercial or white residential areas. Furthermore, there was little upward
pressure on land prices - an important stimulus for the white speculators behind the removals campaign
in Port Elizabeth - as Uitenhage experienced a prolonged recession due to the chronic decline in the
wool trade on which the town's economy was based.
Thus at the end of the colonial era in 1910, Uitenhage retained its first town locations on their
original sites within the Municipal boundaries, the most important being the Kabah Location. By
contrast, Port Elizabeth had passed through a period of prolonged struggle over the inner city locations,
eventually leading to their destruction and the removal of the African population beyond the town border
to the formal Location at New Brighton or to the growing squatter settlement at Korsten.
B. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN SEGREGATION BEFORE 1948
These differences in segregation patterns would increase as the two towns took steps to
accommodate the rapid increase in the black population that accompanied industrialisation before and
after World War II. Both Municipalities designed new housing schemes for African and coloured
people, but these tended to reinforce the trends mentioned above. The Port Elizabeth Municipality built
new housing for Africans, but within New Brighton; furthermore, its first foray into providing
subeconomic housing for other workers yielded a series of segregated coloureds-only and whites-only
housing schemes scattered throughout the city. The only exception to this pattern was Korsten. In
Uitenhage, after consolidating four locations into the "old location" at Kabah in 1936, Municipal housing
schemes for Africans and coloureds were located either in or adjacent to Kabah. As a result, Port
Elizabeth's policies promoted a more thorough-going segregation between coloureds, Africans and
whites, while in Uitenhage the divide was drawn between blacks and whites.
1. Port Elizabeth
As Jennifer Robinson's research shows, local industrial development sparked by World War I
was not an automatic or natural reflex to market conditions, but bore the imprint of an entrepreneurial
local authority seeking to promote Port Elizabeth industry and seize whatever opportunities were open to
them. The expansion of the footwear industry and the first investments by the automobile multinationals
were heavily encouraged by a Council willing to assume large debts to fund the expensive infrastructure
essential to manufacturing and to offer fully serviced industrial townships ready for development. The
resulting growth in the manufacturing workforce also prompted the Council for the first time to provide
housing for Port Elizabeth's working class, and the Council's policies for public housing and for
administering New Brighton Location earned it a reputation (which its promoters eagerly sought to
embellish) as a liberal, progressive city.
While relying on the physically separated racially exclusive Location, the "liberal" Council
eschewed the familiar mechanisms of pass controls for Africans formalized in the 1923 Urban Areas Act
in favour of a paternalistic and pacifying administrative system, codified in extensive regulations executed
through a personalistic Superintendent backed by a network of African "headmen."
If the physical segregation of Africans within urban areas was accomplished through an inherited
framework of colonial restrictions, culminating in the Urban Areas Act of 1923, separating whites from
all other people of colour was a more complicated process. Some Africans, coloureds, Indians, and
Malay possessed property and voting rights in the Cape. But following World War I, the informal
processes of segregation which date from the earliest colonial times intensified as a result of two separate
processes. First, new private housing developments, especially those aimed at white buyers, began
featuring restrictive covenants in their title deeds. The new language prevented purchase by anyone
other than the defined group, which in the vast majority of cases limited ownership to whites.11
The other factor heightening the extent of separation between white and coloureds was the
character of state provision of working class housing. The 1920 Housing Act enabled municipalities to
construct "economic" and "sub-economic" housing,, but it mandated that such schemes be constructed on
racially separate lines. The Port Elizabeth Municipality developed a number of such housing projects
between 1923 and World War II, during which tune more than 1,400 houses were built for Europeans,
2,000 for coloureds, and nearly 4,000 for Africans.
Those built for Africans were constructed as further extensions to New Brighton Location,
known as White Location (310 houses begun in 1928) and McNamee Village (3,506 houses, built between
1938 and 1947). But the new Council houses designated for coloureds and whites were scattered around
the city on available land, without reference to any overall framework of spatial separation of the
races.12 [See Map 1] These single-race schemes were often cited adjacent to one another, divided by a
road or minor physical buffer strip, in contrast to the principles of broad racial zoning characteristic of
later apartheid policies which saw whole sections of cities reserved for particular groups. Indeed, some
of the Council housing schemes for coloureds were located in the southern and largely white residential
areas of the city. These projects formed literal islands of racial occupation, with little intermixing
between coloureds from the housing schemes and whites from the surrounding private developments. In
1936, while there were several areas in the city where substantial numbers of coloureds resided near
whites, such as South End, North End, and Sidwell, (though rigid street-level separation predominated),
there was only one area within the city boundaries where large numbers of Africans lived: Korsten.
Korsten's fast population growth and generally unregulated character contributed to the creation
of a densely settled, unserviced area with high rates of disease and infant mortality. Officially Korsten
was described as a slum, and the Municipal health department repeatedly lobbied the Council to have it
removed on such grounds. Slum or no, Korsten was still a relatively attractive area for people who
couldn't afford or obtain, or didn't want housing within New Brighton. It still lacked the more overt
forms of Council control present in the location, aid it was extremely close to industry. The very
conditions which favoured settlement by Africans made the police anxious: they were worried by the
absence of clear administrative jurisdiction over Korsten, by the irregular patchwork of wood-and-iron
shack settlement making direct control difficult, and by the "intermixing" of Africans and coloureds which
meant repeated violation of laws restricting liquor consumption by Africans. Many members of the Port
Elizabeth City Council shared these concerns, and an additional interest: inspired by the expanding
manufacturing sector, the Council eyed Korsten's central location as a prime spot for development of
new industrial townships, converting "slums" into revenue-producing factory land.
Once Schauderville (for coloureds) and McNamee Village (for Africans) were launched in 1935
and 1938, the Municipality was able to begin condemning Korsten houses under the Slums Act and
moving their inhabitants to the new segregated townships. But the removals never succeeded in
emptying Korsten, nor in remedying the "slum" conditions which had nominally motivated the Council.
In 1946 the population of Korsten had declined, but there were still 10,225 Africans and 3,614 coloureds
resident in the area. Not only had the population of the town vastly expanded during the war, but
according to Robinson many of the people who moved to McNamee Village and Schauderville were
unable to afford the rents charged and ended up moving back to Korsten or to new squatter settlements
even farther from town at Veeplaas, Kleinskool, Miissonvale, and Bethelsdorp. In 1951 the African and
coloured population in Korsten in fact returned to 1936 levels.
Thus, before World War II, the local government of "the Progressive city" had already embraced
full racial segregation in its housing policies, albeit with important differences from the apartheid policies
which would be enacted by the National Party government after 1948. The principle of segregation was
applied to Municipal housing schemes, and tolerated, if not encouraged in the provision of restrictive
covenants, but outside of the Location there was not yet a comprehensive vision of full-scale separation
of residential areas. Certainly the scattered islands of racially exclusive housing estates created tricky
planning problems in later years when central and local planners sought to create large, unified single
race residential zones. But in its early embrace of separation between Africans, coloureds and whites,
Port Elizabeth had a well-established tradition of segregation which would ease the Council's
accommodation with post-1948 policies.
2. Uitenhage
In contrast with Port Elizabeth, the bulk of Uitenhage's industrial growth and population
increase occurred after World War II. Prior to that time the Council initiated no Municipal housing
schemes, nor did it establish a formal African location. Furthermore, coloureds and Africans lived in the
same Municipal Locations. In part Uitenhage's anomalous development stemmed from its small size and
its delayed manufacturing growth, both of which limited its fiscal base. Within the Locations a clear
policy of laissez-faire characterized official policy regarding black residence. After isolating Africans and
coloureds in areas separated from whites, the Municipality paid scant attention to even the minimal levels
of investment and administrative attention required by the "Location Strategy" used in Port Elizabeth.
In the 1920s blacks resided in four proclaimed Locations in Uitenhage: Kabah (the largest),
Doornhoek, Gubbs, and Oatlands, situated respectively to the north, west, south, and east of town. [See
Map 2] Between 1921 and 1936 the African population more than doubled from 3,187 to 6,588, while
the coloured population grew by 42% from 3,052 to 4,334. For the first time in the town's history the
9,437 whites were not a majority of the population.13 The new black population, however, was not
composed of migrants. There was no marked imbalance in gender ratios; in fact throughout the period
there were slightly more women than men in the town.14 The indicators strongly suggest that the black
population was not only becoming larger, but also more stabilized and permanently "urban."15
Kabah had electric street lamps, central water hydrants, and daily rubbish removal from central
points. But conditions were generally deteriorating through the 1930s, and were even worse in the three
other Locations which shared none of Kabah's amenities.16 Depression and drought brought economic
contraction, and combined with a steady inflow of people from the countryside contributed to a large
increase in unemployment.17 The Locations expanded to accommodate the increased population, as
residents built their own houses, with the more well-off securing Council loans for purchasing building
supplies.18
Against a background of growing population, unemployment, and uncertain finances, the
Municipality sought means to cope with the continued movement to Uitenhage. It asked the government
to proclaim influx controls under the Urban Areas Act, though it never applied its more draconian
provisions.19 In 1936 the Council moved to reorganize the locations by demolishing the three smaller
Locations and moving the residents to Kabah. Rather than incurring the expense of building a separate
coloured residential area, the Municipality intended to separate the groups within the Location.20
Furthermore, the Council refused to subsidize new housing; instead, the new residents of Kabah would
be encouraged to build their own homes with materials purchased from the Municipality on instalment.
Both decisions would prove fateful for the future development of Kabah and segregation in Uitenhage.
The Location would be out-of-step with evolving national policy regarding the separation of coloureds
and Africans, and self-built housing would soon reproduce the slum conditions of the old locations.21
The Councillors saw themselves providing a valuable service for African and coloured residents
of the three locations. "In fact," wrote the Town Clerk, "the hutholder from Oatlands Location is moving
from what is an unhealthy and badly laid out slum to what the Council hopes shortly to make into a
model location."22 It was not to be. High death rates for Africans, especially a staggering rate of infant
mortality testified to the grim conditions of life in the "model location."23
The problems in Kabah prompted the Municipality's technical staff directly concerned with
control over Africans to develop new policies aimed at bringing Uitenhage into line with Location
administration elsewhere. In 1943 the Location Superintendent composed a lengthy memorandum
examining Kabah's problems, highlighting the continued presence of coloureds (a violation of the Urban
Areas Act) whom white officials believed contributed to the illicit liquor trade, and the "highly
unsatisfactory" housing, which could only be overcome through provision of separate sub-economic
housing schemes for coloureds and Africans.24 Embracing the principle of segregation, the
Superintendent did not mention removal of the Kabah Location itself.
The Superintendent's policy considerations offer some insight into the views of the Municipality's
Native Affairs bureaucrats. While he favoured segregation, he reminded the Council that it had resolved
in October 1943 to make representations to the Minister for Native Affairs to amend the Urban Areas
Act to allow Africans to acquire urban freehold property. As property holders, he reasoned, Africans
would develop pride of ownership, and would be encouraged to erect suitable houses for themselves,
freeing the Council from housing expenditures. The development of such a class of people would require
higher wages and right of freehold (within segregated areas), and recognition "that the detribalised urban
Native is part and parcel of the urban areas...a member of a community separate from, but no less
important than, the European urban population."25
The same themes were echoed two years later in a joint report by the Medical Officer of Health,
Acting Town Engineer, and the Location Superintendent. This time, however, their solution entailed the
removal of the entire African population: Kabah lacked room for expansion, and it was too close to the
white areas, diminishing housing values and blocking further expansion of the [white] town. The report
introduced a whole new policy proposal: the Kabah Location itself would have to be demolished and
moved to Sandfontein, a municipally-owned farm cast of town.26
The planning schemes of the Municipal technical staff remained on the drawing board for the
duration of the Second World War. But their plans were extremely important in building an intellectual
and policy framework for segregation in the post-war period, embracing the related ideas of extensive
provision of freehold title, sub-economic [subsidized] public housing, separation of coloureds and
Africans, and possible removal and resiting of the Location itself.
Towards the end of the war, the Uitenhage Council took two steps to secure the town's position
in the post-war period, hiring a consultant to devise a general town plan and making an aggressive effort
to attract industrial investment. The Council hired T.B. Floyd as its planning consultant, based on his
reputation as one of the foremost participants in the town planning movement of the 1940s.27 In
Uitenhage, in addition to laying down recommendations for industrial, commercial, and residential zoning
regulations, Floyd's plan dealt at considerable length with the long-running black housing problem.
Floyd's planning vision was more comprehensive than that of the local officials, and surprisingly
conformed very closely to the principles of the future Group Areas Act. "The object of town planning,"
Floyd told a Uitenhage audience, "was, where possible, to zone a town in such a way that the European,
coloured and Native sections of the population were separated by clearly defined natural
barriers...Another principle was the elimination of situations which required the Non-European element
to traverse the areas set aside for Europeans."28
The Kabah location failed the test of both "principles": coloureds and Africans were mixed
together, the location was separated from white areas by a single street, and it was located on the
northern side of town, requiring workers to walk across Uitenhage to reach the heavy industries situated
to the south. Floyd's recommendations incorporated many of the themes developed in the wartime
reports by the town Council bureaucrats, most importantly, moving the location east to Sandfontein.
Africans would be provided with sub-economic housing away from white residential areas and close to
the factories where Africans provided unskilled labour. The coloured section of the location would
remain in place, and sub-economic housing would be provided for them towards the west, away from the
white and present African areas.29
But his argument for removing Kabah was immediately attacked by various Councillors, and
ultimately rejected. Many Councillors recalled the earlier removal of residents from Oatlands, Gubbs
and Doornhoek Locations, and the Council's unfulfilled promises to provide a "model location." By an
overwhelming vote the Council rejected Floyd's proposals for removing Africans from Kabah, and agreed
to remodel Kabah on its present or an adjacent site, with emphasis given to developing a comprehensive
sub-economic housing scheme.30
With the advent of World War II housing construction came to a stop throughout the country,
even as thousands of people flooded into the towns for jobs in industries stimulated by the war. Housing
problems were' a major cause of the urban protest movements of the 1940s, and to cope with the housing
crisis the Smuts Government created the National Housing and Planning Commission.31 Previously
Municipalities were unwilling to build housing, as most Africans could not afford rent levels necessary for
recouping the debt incurred in construction. Loans from the NHPC, however, came at a reduced rate of
interest, and included a formula whereby the central state would assume a large percentage of the losses
on a sub-economic scheme.32
Following NHPC policy the Uitenhage Council solicited funds for creation of sub-economic
housing schemes for Africans, coloureds, and whites, as envisaged in the amended town plan.33 A plan
for an African sub-economic scheme was approved by the Council in 1947, and early the next year the
central Government approved a loan of £99,390 for construction of 320 pairs of semi-detached units in an
extension to Kabah. The area would be named McNaughton Village after the Location Superintendent
serving during the consolidation of the four locations in the 1930s, and officials looked forward to the
eventual expansion of the scheme to include 2,000 semi-detached units (4,000 dwellings), hah7 built by the
Municipality and half by the NHPC. In addition, the Council hoped to have a large portion of the town
commonage surveyed and set out into residential plots which Africans would be permitted to purchase
outright for construction of their own homes.34
Finally, funds would be sought for a sub-economic scheme of 100 units for coloureds in a newly
cleared area west of Kabah, to be called Gerald Smith Township, and for a 60 unit sub-economic scheme
for whites close to a new industrial area at the south end of town. The Council soon applied for a
further sub-economic loan to expand McNaughton Village by 320 more semi-detached pairs. Thus,
under the terms of the new NHPC sub-economic schemes, the Council agreed for the first time in its
history to provide formal housing for its African population, and to provide racially segregated
sub-economic and economic housing for coloureds and whites. It also developed a housing scheme for
coloureds at Jubilee Park where plots would be available for purchase. Any removals would be voluntary
with the promise of a better dwelling than that left behind in Kabah or the town.
Between the end of the war and the accession to power of the Nationalist government in 1948,
the Uitenhage Town Council had approved a vision of development which rejected forced removals and
aimed instead at stabilization of the African population in Kabah and a slow, voluntary segregation
between Africans and coloureds. With the provision of central government funds through the NHPC the
Municipality hoped to achieve what the earlier location reorganization had failed to accomplish: the
establishment of serviced, hygienic, and above all low-cost housing for Location residents in compliance
with the segregation provisions of the Urban Areas Act. Aside from receiving approval for their project
and technical advice from the NHPC and the provincial townships board, the Council planned the future
of the Location virtually without participation by representatives of the central state.
Rather than developing a long-term plan, the Council decided to look into the immediate
problems of Kabah, hoping that "by the time we have dealt with the more urgent problems of Kabah, the
land ownership question should be much clarified."33 Indeed, after the election of 1948 the land
ownership question would be solved, but in a manner not much to the Council's liking. But even as the
Council dedicated itself to a plan to carry the town into the 1950s, its own industrial program was
generating conditions which would foil all its efforts at control.
Between 1945 and 1946 the Council's industrial drive yielded dramatic results, transforming the
political economy of the town forever.36 The former key industries, woolwashing and the railway
workshops, were now overshadowed by two representatives of the newly expanding automobile industry.
The town's fortunes, linked to the Cape Midlands hinterland and to external markets since the
widespread development of wool production in the 19th century, were now tied firmly to the premier
twentieth century international growth industry.
The immediate effect of the boom was to provide employment. For the Port
Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area total black industrial employment increased from 36% of the
industrial workforce in 1935/36 to 56% in 1949/50. In absolute terms, the black industrial workforce
increased from 4,288 in 1935/36 to 17,215 in 1949/50, an increase of over 300%.37 Though no figures
are available for Uitenhage alone, an estimate of the town's black industrial workforce in 1949/50 would
be approximately 2,500. The industrial workforce thus grew at a much faster rate than the African
population as a whole, which increased from 6,588 in 1936 to 16,942 in 1951, or by more than 150%, with
the fastest growth coming in the five years after the war when the new factories came on line.38 While
the population of Kabah swelled, the number of Africans outside the Location doubled from 1,177 in
1947 to 2,127 in 1951, as families crowded into lodgings in the western end of town.39
Despite the introduction of limited influx controls in 1933, the African population had become
the single largest group in the town. But the African population growth was part of a general migration
to the town, which included a sharp increase in the coloured and white population as well. As was the
8case in the 1930s, the increase in population was not a function of formal migrancy; indeed, the evidence
suggests that whole families were moving to Uitemhage, or that families would soon join a husband who
had found work in town.40
The pressing task for the Municipality was the straightforward issue of building enough houses
and overcoming the squalid conditions in the Location. But as early as 1947, as the contours of
Fagan-inspired policy were becoming clear, the Departmental Executive Committee cast serious doubts
on the likelihood of the policy ever succeeding. "The number of applications from employers to the
Location Superintendent asking for plots to be allocated to Native employees grows daily more
formidable."41 Unemployment had virtually been eliminated, and employers complained about the
limited availability of labour in Kabah and pressed the Municipality to allow them to bring in more
Africans from outside. Indeed, a Council committee recommended the repeal of the limited influx
control measures enacted in the 1930s.
Industrialization brought about what the Municipality had long sought to avoid: a sharp and
uncontrolled increase in the black population. By 1948 the Council had to act quickly to implement the
now modest looking project agreed upon two years before, when it optimistically hoped to demolish
sub-standard dwellings and relocate African and coloured occupants to separate Municipal schemes. In
the months before the National Party electoral victory, the Council lacked a viable long-term plan for
accommodating its burgeoning population, resources to build houses, and the power to regulate the
town's population growth. A Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the administration of Kabah
argued that such processes were natural, "and without turning a location into a concentration camp, it
seems impossible to prevent it."42 It was the intention of the National Party - in spirit at least - to do
just that.
m . 1948 AND BEYOND: THE CENTRAL STATE, LOCAL COUNCILS, AND POPULAR
RESISTANCE TO APARTHEID
The United Party Councillors in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth entered the 1948 elections
hopeful that the national housing question would soon be solved along lines amenable to their local
policies: that the Fagan recommendations would be given statutory force upon the re-election of the UP
Government. But the 1948 election changed the political calculus almost completely, as the National
Party's narrow electoral victory cleared the way for enactment of apartheid legislation. Locally, HNP
members were elected to Parliament and to the Councils, which remained, however, in UP hands. The
shift was a small, but nonetheless significant watershed. For the first time since Union in 1910, the
Uitenhage district did not elect a UP/South African Party member to Parliament.
A. THE GROUP AREAS ACT
The NP campaigned on an electoral platform advocating a fundamental departure in urban
policy, especially regarding the reproduction of African labour power. According to Hindson, the short
term policies expressed in the UP's Fagan Report and the NP's Sauer Report had much in common, but
their "long term trajectories were radically different." Where Fagan accepted the inevitability of African
urbanization, seeking to channel influx through "restrained" transitional segregationist measures, Sauer
"wished to reverse African urbanisation and to build up reserve economies so that they could support the
entire African population."43 In response to the urban crisis of the late 1940s, the Sauer Report
advocated a compulsory national system of labour regulation and labour control.44
The new legal framework which the NP rushed to create in its first years in office gave statutory
force to many of the recommendations of the Sauer report.45 These laws, jointly linked, aimed at
regulating and limiting the movement of Africans to the cities, encouraging long-term shrinkage of
African presence in the urban areas, and strengthening social and political segregation between all race
groups. Amendments to existing legislation tightened influx control by Unking it to controls over
employment. African labour contracts would be registered, employers would be forced to pay a Native
Services Levy into the local Native Revenue Account, and a reorganized labour bureau would be
established as the institutional means for limiting movement from rural areas and distributing labour
between the various sectors of the economy.46
Urban policies after 1948 were not merely a function of the political struggles over migratory
labour, however. Municipalities and the central state developed initiatives to reorder, redistribute, and
control urban populations as a whole, whether migratory or settled, African or "non-African". Rather
than viewing the pass laws and the Urban Areas Act in isolation as a response to the problems of
migrant labour, it is important to see how they intersect with other central state policies, especially with
the Group Areas Act [GAA].47
In repealing a contradictory patchwork of provincial legislation, the Group Areas Act sought a
comprehensive system of segregation which would affect all race "groups," including whites, by imposing
control throughout South Africa over inter-racial property transactions and inter-racial changes of
occupation.48 The law depended on the prior identification of every citizen in terms of the Population
Registration Act, and the placement of all individuals within designated racial groups. These groups
would be assigned to a specific, racially homogeneous physical space: the group area. It specified a
series of stages through which control would be progressively tightened leading to the ultimate
declaration of full group areas, racially pure in terms of both ownership and occupation. The Land
Tenure Advisory Board [LTAB], a legislative holdover from an earlier effort to control Indians, later
reconstituted as the Group Areas Board, was given extremely broad powers under amendments to the
Act to inquire into proposed group areas and to recommend proposals for proclamation by the
Minister.49
The impact of the Act was profound: it not only gave the state dramatic new powers to remake
the full physical field of urban life, but it universalised the systematic mechanisms of separation which
were formerly wielded only against Africans.50 The "pure" segregated residential areas were to be
separated by great distances and wide "buffer strips." Finally, the Act posed a major threat to the
stability of the Indian and coloured petite-bourgeoisie, by limiting their access to trading stands or factory
sites in central cities.51
For local Councillors convinced of the efficacy of gradual and voluntary segregation and an
integrated commercial sphere, the implications of the Act were profound. But the full power of the Act
cannot be grasped when it is viewed in isolation: its awesome powers operated (admittedly unevenly and
sometimes contradictorily) in the evolving thicket of apartheid legislation. In combination the GAA and
the Urban Areas Act created enormous new state powers. If the latter Act carried the authority for
segregating and controlling the movement of Africans, the former defmed how the segregated areas were
to be cited vis-a-vis all other racially defined sections.
B. THE POLITICS OF NON-COMPLIANCE IN VITENHAGE
Kabah - where it was planned at all - developed according to a vision quite at odds with the
newly-evolving apartheid framework. In 1951 the 4,200 coloured residents of Kabah made up nearly a
quarter of the Location population, and accounted for more than 60% of the coloured population of
Uitenhage.52 The remainder of the coloured residents lived in the town itself, interspersed with poor
whites and Africans in the older western sections. On its eastern side the Location was separated from
the white sections of town by a single street, while another road on its south-western side divided Kabah
from the proposed coloured sub-economic scheme which the Council had been shepherding through the
national bureaucracy since 1947.
Not only were coloureds and Africans living in close proximity in Kabah, not only were
coloureds and Africans living in the town itself, but the Location was too close to the white sections of
town and too close to the proposed coloured sub-economic scheme. Coloureds would have to be
removed from Kabah to satisfy the requirements of the Urban Areas Act, and they would have to be
moved a suitable distance away from Kabah and from the soon-to-be-declared "white" town to satisfy the
buffer zone requirements of the GAA; furthermore, the Kabah Location itself would have to be moved.
The wide gap between the legal ideal of racially pure areas and the incompatible conditions on the
ground defined the terrain of the local political struggle over national urban policies.
How would the systematic policies be brought to bear on a seemingly intractable situation on the
ground? The policy changes after 1948 were not meant to be instantly implemented. Hendrik Verwoerd,
Minister of Native Affairs, accepted that no one would consider "stopping the development of South
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Africa-not even for a period."53 As Posel makes clear, in distinguishing between "purist" and "practical"
interpretations of policy, there were limits on the purist approach, the extent of which would be
established through real political struggle.54 Since local governments were the primary apparatus of the
state for intervening in the labour market, such bodies became a major site of conflict.
As a first step toward achieving its national goals, the Government enacted subtle, but extremely
important changes in its legal relationship with local authorities. Under 1945 amendments to the Urban
Areas Act the Minister was empowered to proclaim controls on African entry into an urban area "if
requested to do so by a resolution...of any urban local authority...."55 Some municipalities, such as Port
Elizabeth, had opted out of the system, and remained "open cities" where Africans were not subject to
the pass laws. Uitenhage's limited influx control measure from 1933 was never seriously enforced, and
the Council looked forward to its repeal.
The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 reversed the scope of application of influx control:
rather than being applied only where local authorities had requested it, influx control was automatically
instituted throughout the Union. Under the new law the local authority was limited to asking for an
exemption from influx control, and even then, the Government could refuse. The same Act provided for
a compulsory national labour bureau system for all urban and rural areas, repealing a 1949 provision for
voluntary establishment of labour bureaux.56 Local authorities were stripped of an extremely important
statutory power, while influx control was legally, though not yet in practice, extended from a piece-meal
program to a national system.
As a second step, the central government shuffled the bureaucracies responsible for specific
urban policies. The impact of the shifts quickly became apparent to local officials. In late 1951 S.B.
Featherstone, the Uitenhage Town Clerk, received notification from the Secretary for Native Affairs in
Pretoria that funding for the Municipality's proposed coloured sub-economic housing scheme would be
delayed due to its "close proximity to the proclaimed Native location."57 The coloured housing scheme,
laid out under the housing policies of the previous Government, was cited outside the African area, in
compliance with the Urban Areas Act (1945), but was just across the road from the Location, in violation
of the new GAA.
Featherstone was incredulous. The Department and the Municipality both sought separation of
Africans and coloureds in Kabah, "And yet you tell us summarily that the proposed site for a Coloured
Housing Scheme is no good because it is too near the Native Location. Under existing conditions
coloureds and Natives live together in the Location. Surely it is better to develop a separate area for
coloureds alongside the Location even if it is near the Location."58
The Town Clerk's anger was heightened because the Council had expected rapid approval of its
proposal. It had already purchased materials and hired labour, and delays increased expenditure for
storing supplies and retaining workers. More importantly, the Municipality had received a formal
circular a mere four days before receipt of the Secretary's letter announcing that the Native Affairs
Department now had authority to review Housing Commission plans and possessed veto power over the
choice of sites for housing schemes.59 Previously such power was vested only in the National Housing
and Planning Commission. The day before the Secretary's letter was written the Town Clerk had
received an undertaking from the Technical Adviser to the National Housing Commission that he would
personally discuss the matter of the coloured housing scheme with the Native Affairs Department.60
The adviser was Adolph Schauder, architect of Port Elizabeth's "liberal" "Location Strategy" and a
prominent figure in the UP; yet he was not informed of the content of the Native Affairs Secretary's
letter. The Municipality confronted a new and bewildering rearrangement of bureaucratic forces, linked
into power networks to which the UP Councillors enjoyed little or no access. In January 1952 the
Council reached agreement with the Commissioner for Coloured Affairs and with the Native Affairs
Department on the provision of a buffer strip between the proposed coloured scheme and the Location.
Over 2,000 people would have to be removed and 300 houses demolished to make way for the buffer
strip, which the Town Clerk derided as "the task which the Government Departments concerned have
imposed upon the Council in return for the right to build a Coloured Housing Scheme...."61
If the fight over buffer strips was the preliminary bout, application of the GAA was the main
event. The Council's role in the application of the Act was essential and the Land Tenure Advisory
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Board began wooing it in 1951. The LTAB lacked detailed information about the town, and the
Council's participation would legitimate the group areas project in the eyes of many local constituencies
who were suspicious of the policy.*2
As a first step the Council accepted the task of conducting a survey of the town to establish the
precise racial character of ownership and occupation. "This is...the only thing which we as the local
authority should do at this stage," Featherstone, the Town Clerk reported to the Finance and General
Purposes Committee. He hoped that conducting the survey would satisfy the central state that the
Municipality was cooperating while buying time for the Council. "I do not think we should allow
ourselves to be rushed into action," he wrote, "My attitude is not an apathetic one but I am not keen that
we should be the first in the Cape to invoke the machinery of the Act and make what might prove costly
blunders due to ignorance of all the implications."63
On 17 October 1951 the entire Cape Province was declared a "specified area" in terms of the
Group Areas Act, essentially freezing existing conditions.64 The proclamation was a central state
initiative further depriving local authorities of discretion in responding to the GAA. For the next year the
Municipality refused to take the initiative in a series of minor dealings with the LTAB. Then in August
1953, the Secretary of the LTAB in Cape Town asked the Council whether it had reconsidered its
position on the next stage of implementation, declaration of "defined" areas.65 In defined areas the level
of control over "interpenetration" would be increased: unoccupied property could not be built upon nor
existing buildings extended without ministerial approval.
The step was a particularly dangerous one for the Council to take. "Specified" areas, the freeze
on inter-racial changes of ownership and occupation, had been established from above by the central
government in a province-wide proclamation in which the Council had no part But because Municipal
officials possessed the most accurate understanding of conditions on the ground, the Government
expected them to play a major role in "defining" individual properties owned or occupied by individuals of
one race in an area to be reserved for another. By participating in efforts to define areas, the Council
itself would directly harm vested interests in the town, especially black businesses in white areas. At the
end of August the Council's Finance and General Purposes Committee decided to accept the LTAB's
request and directed the Town Clerk to report to the Committee any cases of "possible penetration."
But a curious lobbying effort began at the next full Council meeting where the members were to
vote on the Finance and General Purposes Committee recommendation. During the meeting, the
Council received an urgent letter from the Uitenhage Indian Congress, asking the Council to refrain
from making any decision on the question to allow them time to study the Committee's proposals.
Application of the Act, the letter warned, would "have grievous detrimental and widely devastating effects
on...properties and the very existence and destiny of the future of the Indian community."66 Three of
the four authors were shopowners, and the Vice Chairman, D.R. Lalla, owned four properties. Their
request was accepted, and the matter was referred back to Committee.67
At its next meeting the Committee received the deputation from the Uitenhage Indian Congress,
including the four shopowners. The group stressed "the cordial relations which have always existed
between the Indian community and other sections of the community in Uitenhage," and said that the
Indians living or trading in town had been present there for more than fifty years, a presence which they
did not regard as "penetration." The group asked that since the Act placed sole authority for racial
zoning in the hands of the LTAB, which would eventually make its own representations to the Minister,
"the Council should wait until this happens and not take the initiative...."68 After considering the
deputation's arguments, the Committee decided that the Council should defer the matter indefinitely, "to
remove any suspicion on the part of the non-European sections of the community that the Council is
acting against their interests...." The next week the Committee's new recommendation was carried by the
full Council.69
The Council learned the Government's response within two weeks of the decision. The Finance
and General Purposes Committee received notification from the National Housing and Planning
Commission that the NHPC and LTAB had decided not to consider any applications for housing funds
whatsoever until the LTAB had granted approval for the planning of group areas. Whether or not the
LTAB meant what it said, the local officials who had just refused to cooperate with group areas
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legislation were on notice that in the future they would have to seek approval for all housing plans from
the very authorities they had just snubbed, and Uiitenhage had numerous housing requests pending before
the NHPC.
The LTAB approached the Council again in June, 1954, but in two years of debate Councillors
could not decide whether "to take the initiative to see that people were treated in the most humane way
possible" or to refuse to participate in applying a Haw likely to cause the "economic strangulation of the
Chinese and Indian traders...."70 In support of the latter position, Councillor Gerald Smith "objected to
the very principle of the Act and...did not think the Council should take the lead...[A]s responsibility for
the Act and its administration rested solely with the Government it should be left to them to apply
it...."71 When neither the full Council nor a special subcommittee could break the deadlock members
essentially threw up their hands. In March 1956 the Council decided to "leave the problem to be handled
by the LTAB."72 The position became the official policy of the Council for the next six years.
At the meeting in October 1953, when thu Council originally rejected cooperation following the
protest by the Uitenhage Indian Congress, the leading NP member, Councillor Frans Conradie, reminded
the members that Indians were but 1% of the town's population. Speaking in Afrikaans, he "could not
understand why the Committee had so quickly turned around as a result of formal objection against the
move which had been put forward by the Indian community." Indeed, why did the Council reverse itself
after meeting a single Indian organization?
The Act would surely cause hardships, and the Councillors knew that they would fall most
heavily on a small but important group: Indian, Cliinese, and coloured businessmen and property owners.
The question of removing coloureds from Kabah was no longer a policy issue: from the 1940s the body
had accepted that goal. Councillors rationalized residential segregation on the grounds that hardships
inflicted on blacks by removal were minimized because families received better houses in the new
schemes than those they left behind in Kabah.
But the Group Areas Act's limits on ownership and occupancy threatened to deal a mortal blow
to the economic well-being of those owning businesses in town. A 1959 Municipal survey identified 34
Chinese and 29 Indians as property owners in the town, holding at least 100 properties with a taxable
value of more than £200,000. A 1955 survey identified more than 340 black-owned dwellings and nearly
80 shops.73 Furthermore, as a result of the historical patterns of development on the western end of
town whites owned at least 107 dwellings and 18 shops in likely coloured, Indian, Chinese, or Malay
Group Areas, and would suffer hardships under the Act. Thus the holdings of a number of individuals -
black and white - were rendered insecure. To expropriate all or part of these properties the Council
would lose part of its tax base, be forced to pay compensation, and face the prospect of lengthy and
costly litigation.
Indian, Chinese, and coloured businessmen were not only property owners, but voters, as well.
Though in 1956 the NP succeeded in its protracted constitutional battle to remove coloureds from the
parliamentary voters' roll, they did not fully disenfranchise them: coloureds and Indians in the Cape
remained eligible to vote in local elections into the. 1970s.74 A 1959 survey of "non-white" voters listed
950 "coloureds," amounting to 19% of the registered electorate.7* In a town where the Afrikaner
electorate was increasing, and voted almost exclusively for the NP, a UP Councillor needed all the non-
Afrikaner votes he could muster, and would be ill-advised to be seen threatening Indian, coloured, or
Chinese interests.76 If the Uitenhage Indian Congress and other bodies had special access to the
Council, it was indeed, as Councillor Conradie emphasized, not because of their numbers, but because of
their economic influence and political weight.
C. APARTHEID IN PE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLIANCE
1. The Urban Areas Act: Defiance, Riots, and the End of the Liberal "Experiment"
Port Elizabeth, like Uitenhage, emerged from World War II with a severe housing crisis. The
town's population had grown almost as rapidly as Uitenfaage's and for the same reasons: economic
expansion during and immediately after the war, and from drought in the hinterland. The population
expansion, and the near absence of Municipal construction had contributed to a housing problem far
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worse than that which prompted the program of removals and segregated housing schemes of the late
1930s. Indeed, the efforts to remove Africans from Korsten in 1937 had temporarily reduced the number
of people living there, but only slightly, and Africans continued to constitute the overwhelming majority
of the population. By 1951 there were actually more Africans resident in Korsten than before the
removals. The City Council reaffirmed its pre-war Location strategy, and refused to comply with the new
national influx control legislation. Yet, as Robinson shows, these policies were increasingly out of step
with post-war reality.77
Most importantly, the City Council faced a new threat from below: the increasingly organized
African working class in Port Elizabeth, led by a resurgent African National Congress and Communist
Party. Economic downturn in the late 1940s exacerbated the problems of social reproduction, especially
as the motor industry was hit by restrictions on CKD material imposed to redress the national balance of
payments crisis. The deteriorating social conditions, and especially the apartheid proposals of the
National Party Government generated a resurgence of black political protest, which was as strong in Port
Elizabeth as in any other area of the country.
A renewed ANC with local leadership drawn from the ranks of working class residents protested
proposed rent increases in 1945 and 1947, and in 1949 staged a militant four-month boycott of a steep
rise in bus fares by South African Railways and Harbours.78 The Eastern Cape, and especially Port
Elizabeth and Uitenhage, were also the centres registering the strongest response to the ANC's 1952
Defiance Campaign.79 The growing political mobilization around the campaign, and the intensification
of both the central and local state's police response led in October to a violent riot. At the New
Brighton train station a Railway policeman shot a man whom he suspected of stealing a tin of paint. The
angry crowd which gathered at the scene killed a passing truck driver, and moved on to destroy
white-owned properties in the township, killing 3 more whites in the process, while the police killed seven
Africans.80
The National Party disingenuously laid responsibility for the riots at the door of the Port
Elizabeth City Council and its "liberal" policies. The importance the government attached to its attack on
the Council is shown by the prominence of its chief spokesman: none other than Hendrik Verwoerd,
apartheid's architect as Minister of Native Affairs, who would later serve as Prime Minister during the
most brutal period of NP rule. The riots provided Verwoerd with a convenient opportunity to discredit
resistance to his Native Affairs policies in the run-up to the 1953 elections, in which the NP was in no
sense assured of success.81 Four days after the riot he travelled to Port Elizabeth for talks with NAD
and SAP officials, pointedly snubbing the Mayor and City Council by sending a departmental official to
convey his views. That night, in a public speech at an NP rally, Verwoerd pronounced the liberal
"experiment" a failure, and threatened to impose influx control himself if the Council failed to act.82
In the aftermath of the riot Port Elizabeth came to resemble a military zone, with Permanent
Force armoured convoys carrying out "routine training exercises" on the city streets.83 Armed police
were placed on every bus travelling to New Brighton, more armed policemen were on duty at the bus
terminus, and the vehicles stayed out of the township, letting off passengers half a mile away. The ANC
called for a transport boycott until the police were removed, and the following day the boycott was
virtually total. Four days later the SAR&H System Manager met ANC leaders, the police were removed,
and the action called off. But that very same day the City Council made decisions which would give the
ANC far greater cause for concern.84
On 28 October, ten days after the riot, the City Council voted by an overwhelming majority to
request the Minister of Justice to enforce the Riotous Assemblies Act banning all open-air meetings by
Africans in the city and to request the Minister of Native Affairs to impose a curfew.85 Ten days later
the powers were granted by the Minister of Justice, who also banned 52 African leaders in the Eastern
Cape under the Suppression of Communism Act, and invoked War Emergency Regulations giving the
police power of summary arrest. The emergency restrictions applied not only in Port Elizabeth, but in
Uitenhage, Peddie, King William's Town, and East London, all of which were important centres during
the Defiance Campaign.
As Robinson points out, in the face of pressure from the central government and its local
supporters - including a growing proportion of PE voters - liberal Councillors could retain belief in the
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benevolence of their policies by laying responsibility for the rising tide of protest on agitators rather than
on the material conditions Council policies had themselves spawned. At the October 28th Council
meeting Urban Areas Commissioner Brand's presentation of the pass laws strongly emphasised their
utility in weeding out undesirables, an act of salesmanship keenly attuned to the Councillors' own
self-justifying perspective.86
By its actions the City Council may have hoped to preempt the central state from imposing an
even more draconian response, but the moves only heightened the crisis. In response to the ban and
curfew, the ANC Eastern Cape Regional Committee called for a stay-at-home on November 10, "to
continue until God Almighty has changed the hearts of the City Councillors."87 In the days before the
stay-at-home police reinforcements rushed to Port Elizabeth, while the Council, local employers and
senior representatives of the SAP and Ministries of Native Affairs and Labour hammered out common
strategies. The City Council and Government departments threatened to dismiss any employees taking
part in the action, though local industries adopted a more lenient approach of "no work, no pay," perhaps
as a result of experience gained from months of strikes sparked by dismissals of workers arrested in the
Defiance Campaign. Before the stay-at-home, the local Executive Committee of the ANC negotiated
with the Mayor, and agreed to limit the strike to one day in return for the Mayor's promise to reduce the
curfew to three months and the ban on meetings to one month.
The protest, like the bus boycotts and the: Defiance Campaign before it, was a total success in
both Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage as nearly all .African workers stayed away from work. Retribution
was swift, however, as approximately 5,000 Africans were fired, with the harshest responses coming from
Government departments.88
The central government blamed the stayaway on the Council's "liberal" policies, and in its
aftermath made renewed calls to apply influx control. As noted above, the amended influx control
legislation removed local discretion in its application, and through a Parliamentary proclamation made
the laws automatically applicable in all towns with more than 20,000 African residents, including Port
Elizabeth. Though the Council had requested an exemption from the legislation, Verwoerd rejected their
appeal. Instead he accused the Council of "dereliction of duty" in failing to carry out obligations under
the law, such as inaugurating a labour bureau and. registering African service contracts.89
Central ministries in Pretoria were closely monitoring events in Port Elizabeth, and applying
pressure to force compliance with their aims. When Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs heard press
reports about the Mayor's promise to the ANC to rescind the curfew and ban, he rebuked the Town
Clerk for the Council's ignorance of the emergency laws they had themselves invoked, which could only
be altered by the national Government. After informing the Town Clerk that Verwoerd would not
recommend withdrawing the restrictions, "even when the position has returned to normal," [emphasis
added] Eiselen warned the Council "not [to] compromise itself or the Honourable the Minister by
making any promises which may not accord with the desires of the Minister."90 Once mounted on the
tiger of political repression, the Council found it very difficult to avoid ending up inside.
On 15 January 1953 the Council agreed to implement the influx control provisions of Section 10
of the Urban Areas Act and authorized establishment of a local labour bureau.91 Clinging to its legacy
of liberalism while caught between a militant black resistance movement and an increasingly
interventionist central state, the Council justified its capitulation on grounds that it would administer the
restrictions more fairly. It asserted that the laws would allow greater control over the "tsotsi [gangster]
element," and increased protection for "bona-fide" Africans against those from outside flooding the job
market. The draconian provisions of the Urban /u-eas Act would therefore be administered in the best
interests of Port Elizabeth's Africans!
2. Group Areas
In contrast to the intense political fight over the Urban Areas Act, the Council had far fewer
qualms about compliance with the GAA. Despite the Council's preoccupation with the local emergency
and influx control, city agencies had been busy for over a year conducting the initial research for planning
group areas. Rather than rebelling against the G/VA, as had the Uitenhage Town Council, a majority of
the Port Elizabeth Council saw the legislation as a logical extension of a long-standing Municipal
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segregation policy.
In mid-1952 a Joint Town Planning Committee was established, consisting of representatives of
the Port Elizabeth and its adjacent Walmer Municipality, the Port Elizabeth Divisional Council
(governing the unincorporated area of the Port Elizabeth magisterial district), and representatives of
central state ministries. The Joint Committee developed the first proposals for Group Areas with a view
to coordinated planning for the entire metropolitan area.92
In December 1952 the Committee forwarded its proposals to the Land Tenure Advisory Board.
As a result of years of local segregation - especially in the proliferation of racially restrictive covenants in
new housing developments - the Committee felt that many areas in the city could be declared group
areas immediately. There were a number of "problem" areas, however. Though coloureds had been
segregated in Municipal housing schemes, these were scattered like islands throughout mostly white
residential areas, so there was no single zone of coloured residence in the city.
To accommodate these areas, the Council deviated from the principles embodied in the Act and
pursued by the LTAB, which sought to create wide zones of single-race residence with sufficient land for
expansion, and separated by broad buffer strips.93 By contrast, the Council's initial proposals minimized
the disruption and tremendous expense which would ensue from moving people from the many scattered
areas and rehousing them in a single zone.
First, its definition of "coloured" included Malay, Chinese, and Indian people, though the
Population Registration Act defined these as separate groups, and the GAA stipulated that each "group"
be accommodated in a separate area. Furthermore, it declared Group Areas wherever large
concentrations of coloureds were already living, whereas the Act demanded that they be relocated to a
single, large group area. The plan established "free areas" in zones where large numbers of coloured and
Indian businessmen already owned shops. Finally, in an effort to soften the blows on present citizens,
the proposals envisioned segregation as an extremely long-term process, and granted families 60 years to
move if they lived in an area specified for a different group.
Ultimately the LTAB (renamed the Group Areas Board in 1955) overrode all these deviations,
and in 1960 submitted its recommendations to the Minister of the Interior. The scattered islands of
coloured residence, including South End, Fairview, Lea Place, Stuart Township, and the pockets in North
End and Korsten were declared part of the white group area, though evictions were to be deferred for
the time being. Proposals for free areas for coloured and Indian traders were rejected, and all were to
be moved to the border of the coloured group area. With minor exceptions the recommendations of the
Group Areas Board served as the basis for the final group areas proclamation in Port Elizabeth on 30
May 1961, eight years after the first proposals were submitted to the LTAB. Notwithstanding the local
officials' rationalizations that cooperation with the government would permit a fairer application of the
Act, their proposals were uniformly rejected in favour of a pure vision of segregation dictated from
above. [See Map 3] .
The rather abstract process of planning did little to change the immediate conditions. Despite
differences between the Council and central government over the disposition of areas like South End,
both bodies agreed that Africans resident in the town must be removed to New Brighton, and that
coloureds be removed from Korsten to the existing coloured schemes in Schauderville. Actual removal
and - more important - funds for building alternative accommodation in the officially "preferred"
residential area were far more intractable problems.
3. Forced Removals
The Urban Areas Act and Group Areas Act gave the Municipality interlocking legal authority
and powerful new state institutions to remake Port Elizabeth on the Procrustean bed of apartheid social
engineering. To conform with the new vision of racial planning, the local and central state would have to
destroy the residential checkerboard which had resulted from generations of piecemeal official and
private segregation. People living or owning property in areas defined for other "groups" were to be
moved to the "proper" area, where alternative accommodation would have to be provided to prevent
further squatting. Korsten and nearby Dassiekraal were the state's first targets in its effort to transform
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Port Elizabeth into an apartheid city,
Unlike the removals and housing scheme!; of the late 1930s, these policies were meant to bring
wholesale changes in residential and commercial ownership and occupancy, permanently altering the
urban map. The earlier removals from Korsten had been hampered by the slow provision of housing in
McNamee Village, and by the limited authority to evict Africans under the Slums Act. By contrast, the
second action against Korsten was bolstered by the provisions of the amended UAA, making it an
offense for Africans to live outside of a formal location.94 Not only could Africans be moved en masse,
but the enhanced repressive arsenal provided by new pass laws and labour bureaux could prevent them
from returning, and passes could be used to differentiate between "illegal" Africans and legitimate
coloured residents. Furthermore, the Government's acceptance of "Site and Service" housing in the
Kwazakhele extension to New Brighton enabled it to move people at a rate unencumbered by the slow
pace of house construction. Finally, Africans owning property in Korsten would ultimately be
expropriated, not under the UAA, but under the provisions of the GAA, which prevented ownership by
persons outside of their prescribed group area.
The Korsten removals began in April 1956, and by the end of 1957 more than 28,817 people had
been moved to Kwazakhele. Little resistance was offered, despite the strength of ANC organization in
Port Elizabeth.95 By 1960 there were slightly less than 2,200 Africans living in Korsten.
As Taylor points out, the Korsten removals signified "the conclusive containment and control of
the majority of the identified working class...." In 1951 31% of Africans in Port Elizabeth lived in the
"wrong" area, outside designated Locations. By 1S'6O the figure was reduced to 16%, and by 1985 to
4%.96 The greatest increase in segregation of Africans in Port Elizabeth during the twentieth century
occurred over the period of the second Korsten removals, so that by 1960 segregation between coloureds
and Africans was almost as thorough as between whites and Africans.97 Despite the massive population
growth for both coloureds and Africans over the period, the removals policy succeeded in "canalising"
such growth into racially segregated areas defined and controlled by the state.
The state's preoccupation with removing Africans to Kwazakhele had postponed any attempts to
address the backlog of housing for coloureds. The natural increase of the population was enough to
cause considerable overcrowding in Schauderville, Dower, and other coloured housing schemes. These
housing projects were inadequate to start with, but the huge migration of coloureds to Port Elizabeth
during the 1950s came at a time when very few houses - and no sub-economic schemes - were built by
the Municipality for coloureds.98 The proclamation of group areas in 1961 added immensely to the
problem, as coloureds living in South End, North End and other parts of the city would have to be
rehoused in the new coloured group area stretching north from Schauderville.
These removals occurred throughout the 1960s, and though the bulk of the coloured population
had been relocated by 1970< some smaller areas were cleared only in 1984. The pace of removals was
slowed by a number of financial and political problems.99 The central government's unwillingness to
fund sub-economic housing schemes created immense stumbling blocks to the removals mandated by the
GAA, while the Municipality was unwilling to subsidize the losses which would inevitably result from
placing poor coloureds in economic housing where they couldn't afford the rent.
The removals were startling simply in terms of the magnitude of people moved: in 1985 290
people lived in Fairview, compared to some 10,400 in 1970. Of 6,556 coloured residents of South End in
1960, only nine remained twenty years later. By 1980 only 586 coloureds lived in North End where 1,695
had lived in 1960, and virtually of these people were gone within three years.100
In the space of two decades the NP's apartheid policies reversed community patterns which had
developed over 150 years in North End and South End. In the case of South End the term "erased" is
literally appropriate: save for two mosques, the original buildings were razed; even the rectangular street
grid was destroyed and a new curvilinear pattern superimposed on the old. The demolitions resulted in
the devastation of vast tracts of the city to make way for racially acceptable "redevelopment," which
arrived decades later. In the interim, areas subjected to group areas clearances stood empty and forlorn,
mute monuments to apartheid. These systematic acts of destruction were aimed not simply at uprooting
groups of people, but at destroying all vestiges of entire communities. These outlying coloured areas
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were far from the centre of the city, often far from work, and were not only cut off from the African
townships and white areas, but were differentiated by class and were also isolated from each other.101
In remaking the residential map of Port Elizabeth, the removals orchestrated under the amended
Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts also transformed social relationships within and between legally
defined "groups." Coloureds and Africans were effectively physically separated in the Port Elizabeth
municipal area by the late 1950s, while coloureds were gradually removed from white areas by the early
1970s. In spite of the tremendous surge in population after 1951, when the coloured and African
population more than doubled, by 1970 these increases were almost entirely accommodated within the
exclusively defined boundaries of segregated group areas and African townships.
D. UITENHAGE; THE CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE
1. Passes and Protest: Policies Towards Africans
At the same time that Port Elizabeth Councillors were collaborating closely with the LTAB in
the further segregation of the city, the Uitenhage Town Council dug in its heels at every stage of the
process. Of course Port Elizabeth was a more prominent target than the smaller city, and came under
intense pressure from the central state to conform. The NP government was especially aggressive after
the 1952 riots launched Port Elizabeth's local debate into the mainstream of national political struggles
over Verwoerd's policies towards Africans. Such concerted pressure was not applied in Uitenhage until
the late 1950s and early 1960s, a full decade after the Port Elizabeth Council agreed to cooperate. The
delay is a crucial factor in accounting for differences in segregation between the towns. Where Africans
were generally removed to distant New Brighton by 1957, the old Kabah Location remained intact well
into the 1970s. Even more important, where segregation between Africans and coloureds in Port
Elizabeth - well advanced before 1948 as a result of local processes - was virtually completed by the late
1950s, in Uitenhage such processes were just beginning by the late-1950s, and reached their peak only in
the mid-1970s.
The UP majority on the Uitenhage Town Council was extremely sympathetic to the plight of
Indian and coloured property owners under the GAA, and sought to exert local discretion where
possible, but their attitude towards African residents of the town was considerably different. Much of the
discretion in policy towards Africans had been removed from local authorities and transferred to the
central state bureaucracy by the NP's amendments to the UAA. The Uitenhage body followed it's
neighbour's traditional approach to African affairs, believing the influx of Africans could be successfully
controlled by means other than the strict pass control regulations of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act.
In January 1951 the Native Affairs Committee, chaired by the liberal Councillor E.S. Rens, had resolved
not to apply those elements of Government's labour control where local authorities were still allowed a
measure of discretion.102
It was still necessary, for example, in terms of the Native Laws Amendment Act for the Minister
to consult with the local authority regarding establishment of labour bureaux. At first the Council agreed
to study the question. But it was not until mid-1953, after Port Elizabeth established a bureau, that the
Council agreed in principle to the creation of one in Uitenhage. But before the Council could act
definitively, and without consultation, Government Notice no. 2004 of 1953 declared Uitenhage a
"prescribed area" under the Urban Areas Act, unilaterally establishing a Native Labour Bureau.103
Nor was it mandatory for Uitenhage to apply the Native Services Levy Act, as the original law
[Act no. 64 of 1952, section 2] applied automatically only to towns with more than 20,000 African
inhabitants.104 The Council did not desire proclamation of the Act in the town, as local industry was
extremely hostile to its provisions.105 At the end of 1957 the Municipality was again discussing
application of the Act to Uitenhage, and while the Mayor expected the law would be applied "sooner or
later," the Council applied to be exempted from the levy.106 Opposition to these measures was never
couched in terms of the infringement of rights of Africans. Rather the primary considerations of the
Council were the costs associated with the projects, burdens imposed on business, and doubts about the
effectiveness of the controls themselves.
Soon the Native Affairs Department would take a hard line on the Native Services Levy, but
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only as a power play within a much more important fight: the removal of Kabah. The question of the
Location's future had been a non-issue since the Council's 1945-46 commitment to upgrading Kabah. In
a September 1955 meeting with the LTAB to discuss group areas planning, Council representatives very
briefly referred to the Location, but all agreed that "at this stage it would be an uneconomic and
impractical proposition to try and move the Location."197
But in July 1957, Brownlee, Chief Native Commissioner for the Eastern Cape, bluntly informed
the Council that under new Native Affairs Department policy no housing loans would be granted to a
local authority whose Location did not conform to buffer strip requirements. A 500 yard buffer strip
would be required between Kabah and the white suburbs and between the Location and the new
coloured sub-economic scheme.108 The Municipality had not cleared the buffer zones in 1952 when it
was ordered to move 1,800 persons and 300 dwellings. In the interim many squatters had moved to
those areas and the NAD was demarcating a far larger buffer zone, which would necessitate moving the
most densely settled sections of the Location: over 11,100 persons and 1,242 dwellings.109
But Brownlee had something else in mind. Rather than go to the expense of creating a buffer
strip, which would involve extensive compensation to those moved, while leaving Kabah intact, the
Council, he suggested, should consider moving the entire Location. Brownlee recommended that the
new Location be sited to the south, in the direction of Port Elizabeth, which the NAD was promoting as
a point of concentration of black residential areas in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. The Chief Native
Commissioner, perhaps unconsciously, fully resuscitated T.B. Floyd's 1945 town planning
recommendations. To induce conformity, Brownlee offered to delay for one year the extension of the
Native Services Levy Act to Uitenhage. Even so, in late October 1957 the Council rejected the
unsolicited advice from NAD, on the grounds that the resiting of Kabah Location would be "quite
impracticable."110
It did not take long for the Other shoe to drop. In reply to the Council's action and without
warning NAD announced in late October that the Native Services Levy Act would apply to Uitenhage
retroactively as from 1 October. The Town Clerk applied to the Department to extend the period, as
local officials had no means to begin collecting the levy, but Brownlee refused, and demanded that arrear
service contract fees be collected from business or the Municipality would be held liable for the
uncollected monies on its Native Revenue Account.111
The Council rapidly set to work investigating the potential costs for upgrading or resiting Kabah.
In August 1958 the Council resolved in principle to acquire a farm southeast of the town for a new
African location. The Town Clerk stated the Council's motives most succinctly: "the Council basically has
no particular concern as to whether the Location remains on its present site, or is resited...the issue now
has come down to one purely of finance...."112
After a two-year dispute about which farm to purchase, the renamed Bantu Affairs Department
[BAD] stepped in and persuaded the Council to purchase the farms "Boschoogte" and "Naroes," to the
south-west of town across the Swartkops River. The Councillors were worried about the cost of
developing the farms, and some reconsidered upgrading Kabah. In a meeting with the Council the
Under-Secretary of BAD, Louis Smuts reiterated l:he Department's demand for the Council to relocate
Africans and reserve Kabah for coloured housing, but dangled the carrot of financial support for the
move. "If the Council and the Department worked together," he said, "the problem which appeared to be
a major one would not be found to be so difficult.'113 Still the Council hesitated. Some members
favoured buying the two farms suggested by BAD, others championed another site, while some opposed
relocation entirely. All were worried about embarking on a project riskier than anything previously
attempted by the Council.
When Smuts returned for another session of the Council-in-Committee in November 1960, he
laid down the law. "The Department," he informed the Councillors, "would under no circumstances allow
the Kabah Location to be extended" and another site had to be found. The UAA, he asserted, provided
that it was the duty of the local authority to provide accommodation on a site approved by the Minister
of Bantu Administration and Development, and he would impose a decision if the Council did not
act.114 Only one Councillor advocated retaining Kabah at its present site. In January 1961 the Council
reversed its 1945 decision and subsequent determinations regarding Kabah, and agreed to remove the
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Location.
The Council's decision cannot be separated from the climate of growing political opposition by
blacks, but especially by Africans which developed in Uitenhage, as elsewhere in South Africa during the
late 1950s. In contrast to the earlier deliberations on the application of group areas to Uitenhage, the
decisions regarding resiling of Kabah were made behind closed doors, in secret Council sessions.
Whereas prominent members of the coloured, Indian, and Chinese committees had the opportunity to
address the Councillors, the Council welcomed no representatives of the African people. Some
Councillors did indeed provide a channel of communication to the ANC, and were willing to at least
tolerate its presence in the township. But these attitudes became unpopular as protest movements
developed in the town through the 1950s. As their suffering grew under the repressive central state
policies increasingly being enforced through the local authority, African residents mounted more direct
forms of protest against apartheid and its institutional embodiments, both nationally and locally. Politics
polarized increasingly between the ANC and the Government, with the Council drawn inexorably towards
the latter.
Uitenhage was a stronghold of the ANC throughout the decade, and was one of the
organizations' most active branches in the Cape. Uitenhage was one of the best-mobilized centres in the
Eastern Cape during the 1952 Defiance Campaign.115 Unlike Port Elizabeth, where many protests
occurred at the New Brighton train station, civil disobedience in Uitenhage generally occurred in the
centre of the "white" town at the market square, railway station, and law courts. Yet these were
generally peaceful protests and many of the criticisms of unjust laws were shared (at least privately - and
unbeknown to the protestors) by UP Councillors. Whatever liberal sympathy might have existed for
Africans, however, did not extend to subsequent Congress campaigns, which met a far less tolerant
response.
The 1955 school boycott was extensive in the town, even after ANC provincial and national
leaders distanced themselves from the campaign.116 The most serious confrontations occurred over the
application of Pass Laws to women in 1957 when police violently dispersed anti-pass protesters, and
made mass arrests.117 The education boycotts and pass protests were followed by the prominent 1958
General Election stay-at-home, and by a number of more localized strikes and protests.
In part, the change arose from the altered party composition of the Council. The newly-elected
NP members of the Council made important political and ideological interventions on the body:
bi-lingualism in all Council meetings and documents was first introduced in 1954 for example, and NP
members led efforts to segregate town parks and the morning market.
Perhaps the most significant NP representative was Frans Conradie, who served between 1953
and 1957, when he was elected to the Provincial Council. His rise in the NP was meteoric: married to a
prominent Afrikaans writer, he was a local and Eastern Cape Representative on the South African
Bureau of Racial Affairs, Member of the Provincial Council, then member of the Executive Council of
the Cape, and later MP. But these positions were facilitated through Conradie's real connections,
growing out of his membership in the Broederbond, where he served on the Executive, and from the
early 1960s, as Convenor of its secret watchdog committee on Coloured Affairs, and as a member of the
committee on Relations with English.118 These connections would prove invaluable for the NP and the
central state in the upcoming efforts to extract compliance from the local Council. Conradie's law
partner, G.J. Pieterse, was also a member of the Broederbond, and served intermittently on the Town
Council from 1958 to the early 1970s. Pieterse was secretary of the first branch of the Afrikaanse
Sakekamer to open in a town once dominated by English-speaking businessmen.119 It was these
individuals who led the local attack against the Faganite tradition on the Council, and especially against
the ANC. Their first major initiative was a 1954 attempt to thwart the planned annual meeting of the
Cape ANC at Kabah even though a permit had been granted and the ANC had already paid the fees for
the Location hall.120
As in Port Elizabeth after the 1952 riot, the internal and external NP actors were able to
intensify pressure on the UP Council by using the local "unrest" as a pretext to justify the increased
restrictions provided through the UAA and GAA. Councillors who had previously opposed stronger
controls now sought methods, including registration of service contracts, to eliminate such "undesirable
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elements" from the town.121
Where Indian organizations, which represented a mere 1% of the population, had been able to
influence Council policy directly, African organizations, most especially the ANC, could mobilize large
constituencies throughout the 1950s, but could not: gain the ear of the Council. In contrast to both the
way it handled the group areas legislation, and the manner in which it discussed T.B. Floyd's 1945
recommendations for removing Kabah, the Council agreed to the main lines the NAD policy without
concern for the interests of those most affected, especially once the Government eased the Council's
fiscal burden.
2. Group Areas, Again
When the Secretary of the East Cape Committee of the Group Areas Board (the transformed
LTAB) saw press reports in mid-1961 that the Council had agreed to resite Kabah, he wrote to the Town
Clerk to renew the campaign for group areas.122 Since Kabah would eventually be cleared, plenty of
prime land would be opened up for possible coloured settlement. The thorny group areas problem could
be simplified.
On 17 July 1961 the Council met to consider his request and a UP Councillor managed to push
through a resolution declaring "that the Council does not wish to discuss the question...or to submit
proposals..." But where in years past large majorities stood on principle in rejecting any participation
with the GAA, by 1961 the Councillors lamely claimed to be too preoccupied with plans to resite the
African location to take up such a vexing issue. And even then the resolution passed only narrowly.
"Council snubs Group Areas Board," was the headline in the Johannesburg-based Sunday Times,
while the Port Elizabeth Evening Post editorialized that "Most Councillors have stood firm against the
great hardships which compulsory racial grouping would bring." But the pro-Government Die Oosterlig
interpreted events differently. "The constituency in which the town lies has sent representatives of
apartheid to the Assembly and Provincial Council. The majority in the City Council is therefore a mere
island in the political sea." The editorial concluded, "'Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's' is a
good idea for them to bear in mind."123
The Afrikaans daily had a far clearer reading of the prevailing balance of political power. In the
1958 General Elections the NP greatly increased both its number of seats and its share of the popular
vote. In both the 1960 referendum and the 1961 general election it one a majority of the (white) popular
vote, which translated into a massive parliamentaiy majority. The local UP Councillors could hardly
claim to be representing the majority of white opinion when their national party was being consistently
beaten in election after election. In June 1962 the Council accepted without opposition a resolution to
submit group areas proposals to the Department of Community Development.
However, agreement was possible only once a compromise had been forged to reduce the
hardships for Indian and Chinese traders. The proposal came from none other than GJ . Pieterse, of the
local law firm Conradie, Pieterse & Campher. Tlirough his past participation on the Council, Pieterse
was well aware that the body had no objections to residential segregation, but that it balked at any
restrictions on business, which "should be left undisturbed."124 The Council's position clearly
contradicted the principles of the GAA, and would lead to permanent deadlock. But Pieterse identified
a way around the impasse: he recommended thai: the Council petition the government to declare a free
trade zone, allowing "non-white" businesses to continue in something like their current form.
Pieterse developed the strategy while preparing an application for a local Indian businessman
who sought a group areas permit. His client was none other than A.S. Kooverjee, a landowner,
businessman, and member of the Uitenhage Indian Congress. Kooverjee was also a central participant in
the delegation which had successfully pressured the Council to reverse itself in 1953 and refuse to
cooperate with the LTAB. Kooverjee had made a shrewd choice of lawyers. Pieterse's partner was now
an insider in Broederbond and Cape provincial government policy-making circles; the lawyers' knowledge
of the Council and their connections to the responsible central ministries made them extremely
well-positioned to broker a group areas deal between the Council and the government.125
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With hopes of obtaining such an exemption, the Council's major objection to the GAA fell away,
and four months later it voted unanimously to cooperate with the central Government in the planning of
group areas and agreed to submit formal proposals for application of the Act to the town. From that
date until the proclamation of group areas in Uitenhage on 20 October 1967, the Council cooperated
with the Government. [See Map 4] A familiar argument - well rehearsed in Port Elizabeth in 1952 -
served as justification for its action: "Now...the Council has decided to prepare a plan, arguing that if it
does not do so, the Government will intervene...and impose something far more drastic for the victims of
the Act."126 By "trying not to be cruel," as the Evening Post put it, the Council reversed its
long-standing position of noncompliance with a centrepiece of apartheid legislation. An era of Municipal
contestation of apartheid policy had come to a close.
Local Afrikaner notables had spun a new web of influence to the central state and to the NP,
shouldering aside the old UP political network whose connections to the centre had been severed since
1948. Where Councillors and officials, especially the Town Clerk, had faced a decade of governmental
coercion and brazen interventions, the 1960s promised a different mode of politics. The space for
opposition had all but disappeared, and the new power brokers no longer had English surnames. The
character of politics in the town was transformed more thoroughly than at any time since the
reestablishment of British rule at the Cape in 1806.
Uitenhage Town Councillors, unlike their counterparts in Port Elizabeth, had consistently framed
their choices as either noncooperation with an unjust policy, or working within the legal framework to
apply the harsh regulations as fairly as possible: "trying not to be cruel." At the end of the day, local
defensive battles could delay but not reverse central policy. Faced by a central state willing to wield new
resources in an effort to gain control, local officials accepted the second option, to work within the rules
of the game as established by the NP, fearing that policies would be forced upon them, as occurred in
Johannesburg and Cape Town. These rules were as much ideological as legal or bureaucratic, and they
became the basic framework within which the Council would pursue policy towards Africans and
coloureds until the 1980s.
In playing by the rules, however, the Council was aided by a compromise which carefully
accommodated the one black constituency towards which Councillors could least afford to be cruel.
Coloureds, Indians, and Chinese businessmen and property owners had access to the Council by virtue of
property and the franchise, and they used their assets at key points to influence the Council. For
Africans, no such avenues existed to the Council or to the state. Possessing neither property nor the
vote, they had little to offer to the Council. Indeed, the issues motivating their growing protest
movement in the 1950s could not be satisfied except through a transformation of a political system in
which the Council itself played a crucial role, and which even the most liberal Councillor had no interest
in altering. The few whites who were willing at least to entertain African grievances became increasingly
isolated as the decade passed and the tide was running against their form of paternalism. Between 1957
and 1960 the fate of the Uitenhage's century-old African community was sealed behind closed doors
where economic efficiency and the tax burden to be borne by the largely white ratepayers were the only
factors taken into account. Council hostility to the removals dissipated once the central state agreed to
assist in the financial burden of relocation.
Not only did the Council agree to virtually the same policy they had rejected when it was
suggested in 1945 by their own expert town planning consultant, but they revived another legacy of the
town's past. By purchasing the farms "Boschoogte" and "Naroes" for the new township, they unknowingly
sited the new township, Kwanobuhle, "Place of Beauty," on land used as a concentration camp during the
Anglo-Boer War.
IV. CONCLUSION
A central theme of this paper is the growing central state control over local affairs, particularly
over the reproduction of the urban black population. Before 1948 the Council was relatively unhindered
by the central state in its efforts or (more accurately) non-efforts to house blacks. In practice the relative
freedom meant inaction, as neither the Council nor the Government would supply sufficient funds for
upgrading black communities. But through the 1950s, and especially after 1957 the space for local
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opposition narrowed considerably. Three key factors account for this process.
First, the central state formally narrowed the scope of Municipal discretion in implementing
central state policies; the respective Ministers came to wield virtually dictatorial powers to pursue policies
over the heads of recalcitrant local authorities. The process culminated in the early 1970s when
Municipalities were formally stripped of authority over their coloured, Indian, and African residents.
Second, the central state began to exert greater bureaucratic pressure on the Councils by
reorganizing lines of authority. Central ministries which had not previously been involved in particular
issues now held veto power over local decisions.
Third, the new bureaucratic machinery at the national level and the political will to use it gave
the central state much greater power to manipulate local authorities' fiscal dependence, thus enabling it
to force agreement with national policy. On the one hand, departments could threaten to withhold funds
for completely unrelated projects to force compliance with directives of NAD or the LTAB. On the
other hand, extraordinary grants of funds could be made to defray the cost to local authorities of
implementing national policy, thus enabling the central state to buy compliance. These deals were
brokered through a new stratum of Afrikaner political operators, replacing the old UP businessmen and
politicians who dominated many Councils before 1948, and Unking the local authority to the central state
and National Party.
Over the previous decade the central state had reorganized important parts of the state
apparatus, increased its penetration of the state as a whole, and had developed its legal/ideological and
administrative capacities to intervene more directly in civil society in pursuit of its policy goals. By
1961-62 as the costs of opposition increased, as the benefits to be gained by cooperation increased, and
as the likelihood that the NP would never be replaced by a UP government grew, Councillors wavered in
opposition and quietly went ahead with implementing apartheid policy. In the end, however, the central
state was able to force local authorities to comply with apartheid policy - "to Render unto Caesar" - but it
could not remake the world in its own image. The Council's stalling efforts unintentionally succeeded in
delaying proclamation of Group Areas in Uitenhage until 1967 (six years after Port Elizabeth, even
though Uitenhage presented far fewer planning problems), and the removal of the Kabah Location did
not start until December 1968. The removals to Kwanobuhle were continually stalled by funding
problems, which delayed the construction of more houses, thereby further slowing group areas removals,
since Africans had to be removed from the land in Kabah before housing for coloureds could be built.
Both projects were thus consistently slowed so thai: through the 1970s there were still parts of town
where coloureds and Africans lived either in the S£ime area or very close together.
When the state was finally able to embark on the segregation project, it faced the new political
economy of the 1960s boom: the expanding motor industry, and a burgeoning industrial workforce.
These demands on local authorities were not accommodated in the central state planners' blueprints. As
the UP Council had been caught in the late 1940s with a dated solution unable to cope with
contemporary problems, so too the Government's agenda for reorganizing urban residential and
commercial space could not cope with changes brought about by the economic boom of the 1960s.
At the very moment when Africans and coloureds were moving into semi-skilled and skilled job
positions in the expanding automobile industry, the state was running into extreme difficulties in its task
to segregate the black working class in Uitenhage. In Port Elizabeth, the segregation between coloureds
and Africans was completed in the 1950s, before the industrial boom, and subsequent growth in the
working class could then be channelled into racially separate communities. In Uitenhage, the delays in
the application of group areas and urban areas legislation meant that the 1960s expansion occurred in
communities not yet reconstructed by apartheid planning principles. Working class formation in Port
Elizabeth was thus fractured on lines of race between coloured and African workers, bottled up in
spatially separate residential areas deliberately planned by apartheid bureaucrats to impede social
interaction across communities. In this respect, the application of apartheid planning principles to Port
Elizabeth intensified a pattern of racial segregation in place from the colonial era, and led to the almost
total separation of races. Class became relatively less salient as a principle of residential ordering, and
communities became differentiated on racial grounds.
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By contrast, the pattern of segregation in Uitenhage was not nearly as well-ordered before 1948.
While blacks and whites were generally separated, the Kabah location was a mixed race community,
where most coloureds lived either with or in close proximity to African people. As a result of struggles
between the central state and the City Council, and later due to financial difficulties in building suitable
accommodation, the NP's racial policies did little to alter these patterns, at least not before the mid-
1970s. As a result, working class formation in Uitenhage occurred on a terrain not fully defined by
apartheid principles, not fully differentiated on racial grounds, which allowed possibilities for contact and
coordination across racial lines in common communities. These social links created rich bonds of
familiarity between coloured and African workers, and networks of social interaction in Uitenhage, while
the more thorough application of apartheid in Port Elizabeth impeded the development of such bonds -
indeed, was targeted at destroying them. Such bonds between African and coloured workers would soon
give a powerful boost to the growth of non-racial trade unionism in Uitenhage from the early 1970s,
when industrial organization revived.
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